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 The return of theater-wide competition in Europe with a revanchist Russia presents challenges to U.S. national-security interests. Addressing these 
challenges would benefit from the strategic thought of Baron Antoine-Henri de 
Jomini, a celebrated Swiss-born Napoleonic officer and one of the first modern 
theorists of war.1 A potential path for the U.S. military to compete effectively 
against Russia in the European theater, while preparing for potential combat op-
erations, resides in extracts from Jomini’s operational theory of warfare applied 
to the maritime domain. Jomini’s writings on campaigning and his “rectangular 
template” for gaining theater advantage offer a model for the United States to 
confront Russia’s asymmetric and “gray zone” threats in Europe.2
The European theater is highly significant for Russian national security. On land, 
besides offering direct and historical invasion routes into Russia’s interior, eastern 
Europe was a traditional sphere of Russian influence dating to tsarist times. In the 
modern era, the adjacent maritime regions have tak-
en on greater strategic importance. The Barents Sea 
and White Sea are the cornerstones of Russia’s pow-
er projection into the Arctic.3 In the Baltic Sea, Rus-
sia’s Kaliningrad exclave, several U.S. NATO allies, 
concerned neutral states, and wider European se-
curity and energy interests all converge.4 The Black 
and Caspian Seas touch several Russian national- 
security interests and serve as platforms for on-
going Russian political and military activities in 
Ukraine, Crimea, Georgia, Central Asia, and the 
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wider Middle East. Russia continues to expand the size and capability of its Cas-
pian Sea flotilla to serve further competitive adventurism in the region.5 Finally, 
eastern Europe’s riverine network provides direct access into the Russian heart-
land via the Dnieper, Don, and Volga feeder rivers.
Given the strategic importance of Europe’s maritime environment to Russia, a 
U.S. competition and battlefield-preparation campaign built on irregular warfare 
and Jominian concepts, and leveraging U.S. naval special-warfare expertise as 
part of a family of integrated and low-visibility or light-footprint capabilities— 
such as subsurface intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) methods 
and cyber actions—well may be the decisive approach to gaining an advantage 
over Russia prior to conflict. As noted by General Tod Wolters, Commander, 
U.S. European Command and Supreme Allied Commander Europe, “Every day, 
[European Command] and NATO compete to challenge and counter Russia’s 
below-the-threshold strategy, and to counterbalance the multi-faceted and capable 
military power which underwrite[s] its malign approach.”6 Jomini’s campaign-
ing theory, in combination with maritime special-operations capabilities, sug-
gests a convincing maritime approach for supporting these efforts to contest Rus-
sia’s malign activity in Europe while remaining below the level of armed conflict, 
and supporting a broader conventional effort to prepare a possible future war- 
fighting environment in a manner consistent with the Department of Defense’s 
approach for using irregular warfare to secure advantages during peacetime and 
prior to potential conflicts.7
This article will first highlight the vexing nature of “gray zone” competition 
against Russia for the U.S. military in Europe and contrast this with Russia’s 
own adroitness. It then will distill the concepts from Jomini’s theory of cam-
paigning that are pertinent to competing with Russia and apply them to a pro-
posed maritime irregular-warfare campaign framework. These concepts include 
theater objectives, lines of effort, a rectangular template for organizing and ap-
plying forces, and measures of effectiveness. From this foundation, I develop 
an operational approach using naval special-warfare capabilities and a suite of 
special operations forces–enabled cyber and enhanced ISR capabilities for con-
ducting several peacetime missions against Russian activities: understanding the 
environment through special reconnaissance; preparing the environment to en-
able the military to transition rapidly from peacetime to combat operations, if 
needed; and performing active naval diplomacy measures, for both deterrent 
and coercive effect. This path offers a mechanism to move the U.S. defense es-
tablishment from contemplating competition to acting. It is also a step toward 
addressing findings in government-sponsored analysis that “more emphasis 
should be placed on developing operational-level guidance for employing spe-
cial operations forces (SOF) in competition below armed conflict,” specifically 
2
Naval War College Review, Vol. 74 [2021], No. 4, Art. 7
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss4/7
 S T R I N G E R  8 1
in the European theater.8 This emphasis is needed to provide greater clarity for 
the future training and resourcing of special operations forces for their missions 
against great-power adversaries, which are different in many respects from the 
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency focus of the past two decades.
THE CHALLENGE OF COMPETITION AND GRAY-ZONE  
OPERATIONS
The 2018 U.S. National Defense Strategy declared that “[i]nter-state strate-
gic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national 
security.”9 The Biden administration’s 2021 Interim National Security Strategic 
Guidance continues this policy thread and outlines an agenda for the United 
States “to prevail in strategic competition.”10
The concept of great-power competition raises three vexing issues for the U.S. 
military. First, the definition and contours of competition remain amorphous. 
There is a lack of consensus and agreement among various schools of traditional 
international-relations thought on great-power competition and what it means 
for the United States. A 2018 study postulates that there is no consensus on the 
definition of competition among states and assesses that little U.S. analysis or fore-
thought has been given to the characteristics of this emergent era.11 While this 
latter point may be an extreme conclusion, it nevertheless suggests a lack of clar-
ity in U.S. national-security approaches to competition.
Second, the national-security goals and strategy for competing against other 
great powers are nebulous. Amid this uncertainty, the U.S. military is exhorted 
to “adopt a better framework for understanding, describing, and participating 
within a competitive operational environment.”12 The current notion of great-
power competition, though, offers little prescription and unclear direction for 
U.S. defense policy.13
Third, the assumed primacy of nonmilitary activities in competition raises 
questions about the application of military power to compete with adversar-
ies and the appropriate nesting of military capabilities within a broader whole-
of-government approach. Russia’s “gray zone operations are a form of coercion 
that mix conventional and unconventional military activities with other security 
forces and non-military actions—like diplomacy, influence operations, and eco-
nomic pressures.”14 U.S. Defense Department guidance asserts that the military 
element of national power needs to find its role and approach to remain below 
the level of armed conflict while creating strategic opportunities for the U.S. 
interagency and allies.15 The preceding points highlight the lack of direction, un-
derstanding, and focus within the U.S. national-security establishment on how 
to apply military power effectively to compete against Russia without precipi-
tous escalation.
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In contrast, Russia appears to operate effectively in this gray competitive 
space, given its strategic culture, historical experience, and limitations as a great 
power. The Kremlin employs a mixture of national-power instruments to ex-
ploit and achieve temporal and regional advantages while avoiding its targets’ 
thresholds for armed conflict.16 With the perspective that competition is an 
integral element of the “permanent state of war” mentality that some analysts 
believe characterizes Russian national-security thinking on interstate rela-
tions, Russia employs a set of hybrid means to attempt to destabilize relevant 
countries and weaken both U.S. influence and the NATO alliance.17 As General 
Wolters noted, this “below-the-threshold of armed conflict strategy via proxies 
and intermediary forces . . . attempt[s] to weaken, divide, and intimidate [U.S.] 
Allies and partners using a range of covert, difficult-to-attribute, and malign 
actions.”18 President Vladimir Putin’s modern empire-building effort to restore 
Russian prestige and great-power status does not rely solely on military power 
but includes a “postmodern” mix of political blackmail and subversion, infor-
mation and cyber operations, economic leverage and financial intimidation, 
and military sales and exercises.19 This mix is not new, and much of it flows 
from the legacy of Soviet “active measures” dating to the Bolshevik Revolution 
and the Cold War.20
Russia has demonstrated these methods in Georgia, Ukraine, Syria, Libya, 
and the High North. In Georgia, Moscow initiated a passport-distribution 
scheme in 2002 to create “Russian citizens” in the Abkhazia and South Os-
setia regions who later could be instrumentalized as “oppressed minorities” 
leading up to the August 2008 Russo-Georgian war. This consular effort was 
accompanied later by cyber denial-of-service attacks launched from Russian 
servers that paralyzed Georgian government websites prior to the conventional 
conflict.21 In Ukraine, the Kremlin used information operations to shape and 
control a pro-Russian narrative of the 2013–14 Maidan revolution and sub-
sequent takeover of Crimea and contested occupation of the Donbas region. 
Armies of Russian bloggers, journalists, and propagandists sustained a social 
media campaign designed to undermine pro-Western Ukrainian actors, create 
fear within the pro-Russian population, and obscure Russian irregular-warfare 
activity by proxy forces in Crimea.22 These operations often had primacy over 
more-conventional military activities.
In Syria, Russia has used proxies effectively to steady the Assad regime.23 
Specifically, Russia’s use of operatives from the Wagner Group, a private mili-
tary company—many recruited from among former intelligence-services per-
sonnel and military veterans—allowed Russia to attack U.S. and coalition forces 
in Syria in February 2018 while maintaining plausible deniability.24 Similarly, 
in Libya, Russia expanded its use of deniable proxies from the Wagner Group 
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to advise Libyan National Army troops as well as to engage in direct combat 
operations. These efforts enhance Russia’s geopolitical leverage in the Mediter-
ranean beyond its Syrian naval bases while obscuring official Russian govern-
ment involvement.25
Finally, in the maritime domain, particularly in the High North, Russia has 
continued opportunities for mischief by applying subversive measures on geo-
graphically isolated islands, undersea cables, energy supplies, and commercial 
supply chains through front companies, proxies, and dual-use commercial ves-
sels.26 These ambiguous Russian activities can be nested in the concepts pro-
mulgated by the Russian chief of the general staff Valery Gerasimov in widely 
cited remarks published in February 2013, in which he urged a new formula-
tion of doctrine and tactics to win the wars of the twenty-first century, where 
the lines between war and peace are blurred.27 Russia’s gray-zone operations 
can be combatted, and perhaps even reversed, by applying Jominian principles 
to an irregular-warfare framework to develop an operational approach that 
applies naval special-operations tools against Russia in the European theater’s 
maritime competitive space.
JOMINIAN THEORY AND A MARITIME CAMPAIGN FRAMEWORK
Russian power can be confronted and contained using principles of strategic 
organization that Jomini outlined in his best-known work, Summary of the Art 
of War.28 If one abstracts Russia’s broad strategic efforts and superimposes them 
on the geographic Eurasian landmass, Jomini’s principles of geometry, strategic 
points, and force provide an analytical framework that illuminates the options for 
integrating naval and other special operations forces into a synchronized, theater-
level campaign.29 Like Clausewitz and On War, Jomini is often ambiguous about 
his theory of warfare, requiring interpretation for modern application.30 Also, 
Jomini’s theory was developed in a nineteenth-century context that was charac-
terized by well-defined conditions of peace and war. This consideration may limit 
the full application of his ideas to current gray-zone operations, but—considering 
the Russian national-security perspective that interstate relations are a perma-
nent and fluid state of war, and that the current conflict with the United States 
and the West is being fought across multiple domains, albeit for the most part in 
a nonlethal fashion—Jominian principles may be more relevant than expected.31 
In particular, Jomini’s ideas on campaigning, a rectangular template for theater 
operations, and a concentration on decisive strategic points provide a basis for 
conceptualizing a special operations–centered maritime irregular-warfare cam-
paign against Russia in the European area of operations.
For Jomini, the campaign was a central element of warfare requiring careful 
planning and preparation, in which the commander’s main objective was to 
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dominate his assigned zone of operations or theater.32 Jomini further charac-
terized the operational theater as “the territory upon which the parties may as-
sail each other.”33 In modern terms, this territory is the geographic area where 
adversaries engage either in competition below the threshold of conflict or in 
actual war. Consistent with giving primacy to the campaign and emphasiz-
ing the theater of operations, Jomini was spatially oriented. He believed that 
“[s]trategy is the art of making war upon the map and comprehends the whole 
theater of operations.”34 To gain theater advantage and domination, Jomini 
theorized what I call a “rectangular template” for visualizing his recommend-
ed operational approach, writing, “If every theater of war forms a figure pre-
senting four faces more or less regular, one of the armies, at the opening of 
the campaign, may hold one of these faces . . . while the enemy occupies the 
other. . . . The different ways of occupying this theater will lead to widely dif-
ferent combinations.” Jomini’s prescription for domination was to control at 
least two, and potentially three, sides of this rectangle to wrest control and 
advantage from an adversary. A commander achieved this control by identify-
ing and controlling decisive strategic points relative to the theater rectangle. 
These decisive strategic points, often geographic, were characterized by some 
enduring military significance for the theater and the military operations 
within its boundaries. Jomini further indicated that some of these strategic lo-
cations possessed a high political value and termed these sites “political objec-
tive points.” For Jomini, success implied concentrating forces at these decisive 
points to dominate the theater rectangle while taking the initiative to keep an 
opponent off balance.35
Applied to twenty-first-century conditions and within a campaign frame-
work, Jomini’s theoretical concepts illustrate a path to gain theater advan-
tage over Russia’s gray-zone campaigns for influence in Europe. First, if the 
Jominian theater aim is to “dominate the assigned zone of operations,” then U.S. 
theater objectives in maritime competition should be the disruption of Russian 
activities that are below the threshold of war while gaining the initiative in that 
competitive space and imposing greater costs on Russian actions.
Placing Jomini’s rectangular template over eastern Europe—the target of most 
of Russia’s hybrid activity—suggests that the most promising locations for strate-
gic efforts exist primarily within the maritime space (see map). Russia holds its 
north–south baseline on the east side of the rectangle and the U.S. and NATO 
allies hold the north–south baseline on the western face. The other two faces 
are largely maritime corridors. The northern west–east face includes the Baltic, 
Barents, and White Seas, and the southern face consists of the Black and Caspian 
Seas. Both faces’ respective littoral doorways provide Jominian opportunities to 
influence the other two faces of the rectangle and gain the competitive initiative 
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by surveilling, disrupting, or dislocating Russian activities while remaining below 
the level of armed conflict.
Russia has a long landmass border of approximately 4,700 miles stretching 
from Norway to Azerbaijan, flanked by these maritime access points in the Ba-
rents and White Seas and the Baltic, Black, and Caspian Seas, including their 
related rivers and estuaries. Although U.S. Army, Air Force, and Marine ground 
units conduct frequent deterrence activities along the Russian land border, often 
with allies and partners, the land portion of this border is more restrictive for U.S. 
disruptive competitive action owing to political, military, and legal restraints and 
escalation considerations.
In contrast, the maritime avenues offer the best ingress and access points into 
Russian areas of interest and influence with legal and political space that avoids 
the unacceptable escalatory risks of acting across sovereign land boundaries. 
This operational approach would adhere to two relevant Jominian principles. 
The first is to maneuver forces to threaten strategic decisive points, specifically 
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implies activities relying on access and relationships that prepare the environ-
ment to allow for a rapid transition by the U.S. military into offensive combat 
operations if needed. The maritime environment provides international navi-
gational rights in the Barents, White, Baltic, and Black Seas, which offer the 
flexibility to approach Russia’s strategic decisive points in its littoral regions in 
a manner that the land borders with Russia do not permit. Additionally, the 
littoral regions offer a surfeit of strategic decisive points, or targets of interest, 
including the Kola Peninsula, the Baltic islands, Crimea, and the mouth of the 
Don River.
These points host critical infrastructure and strategic forces that are essen-
tial to Russian national defense, and special operations forces’ peacetime opera-
tions near these points can provide greater situational awareness and under-
standing of these nodes for numerous purposes, ranging from early warning to 
preparation for contingency operations. (Given the Caspian Sea’s inland loca-
tion, a coastal state would have to grant access, which involves some diplomatic 
relationships that presently are challenging for the United States.) Additionally, 
in his section in the Art of War on “descents,” Jomini mentions maritime opera-
tions as being valuable “[t]o make a diversion, at once political and military,” 
to distract or impose costs on an enemy.37 While Jomini’s comments refer to 
operations in actual conflict, this principle has validity for maritime operations 
during peacetime competition as well. Finally, while one can argue that cyber 
and information operations are unconstrained by physical borders and make 
them irrelevant, these activities are not stand-alone as currently practiced, 
but instead generally are linked to an accessible physical domain—air, land, 
or sea—to achieve desired effects. In the case of Russia, the maritime domain 
seems to offer the best opportunities for access and maneuver at lower escala-
tion risk and can be used to amplify the political effects of cyber and informa-
tion operations.
Jomini does not directly discuss in the Art of War how to assess a campaign’s 
success in the modern sense, since in his era victory in combat and the oc-
cupation of territory were the marks of effectiveness.38 Nevertheless, by apply-
ing his principles to a modern competition campaign, measures of effective-
ness would be indicated and derived from changes in Russian activities and 
behavior in the respective maritime regions of interest and near the identified 
decisive strategic points, as a result of U.S. naval special-operations activity. 
Qualitative assessment of Russian reactions to U.S. activities and an estimation 
of the costs imposed could be initial criteria for evaluation. These measures 
would be developed further as the campaign and force experience progressed. 
To convert any proposed campaign objectives, lines of effort, and measures of 
effectiveness into action, an operational approach for naval maritime special 
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operations forces provides the application of special-operations capabilities to 
exploit Russia’s maritime flanks strategically.
NAVAL SPECIAL-WARFARE OPERATIONAL APPROACH
An operational approach (what U.S. military planners call “ways”) is simply a 
description of the broad actions the military must take to achieve the desired 
objectives (known as “ends”).39 This section sketches out the operational ap-
proach for naval special operations to execute a Jominian irregular-warfare 
campaign to achieve several competitive objectives: disrupt Russian activities 
occurring below the threshold of war; gain initiative in the competitive space; 
impose greater costs on Russian actions; and prepare the theater for potential 
combat operations. According to Lieutenant General James Dubik, USA (Ret.), 
and Nic Vincent, from a military perspective success in interstate competition 
requires operating in the gray zone with low-signature, nimble, and rapidly de-
ployable forces.40 This outlook implies using special operations forces for com-
petition because of their low visibility, small-footprint profile, and expertise 
in close-in maritime and riverine access. Special operations forces and naval 
special warfare have powerful, flexible tools that can be integrated across the 
full range of conflict and operations, as part of whole-of-government efforts, 
and with partner nations and U.S. allies to deter Russian activities of concern.
Besides U.S. naval special-warfare units’ unique capabilities in maritime 
close access and placement, they possess equipment ranging from a family 
of low-visibility, multimission surface and subsurface tactical craft to sophis-
ticated signals and communications gear.41 The proposed irregular-warfare 
campaign would use a dedicated naval special warfare group and its enablers, 
in conjunction with other U.S. agencies to provide both cyber and ISR sup-
port. Implementing the Jominian approach advocated in and around the Bal-
tic, Black, Caspian, and Barents and White Seas would include the following: 
conducting special reconnaissance to understand the maritime environment 
better; executing special missions for the preparation of the environment for 
eventual combat operations; and performing visible information operations as 
a subset of naval diplomatic measures to support more-cogent counter-Russia 
or pro-U.S. and -NATO narratives. The first two missions mentioned directly 
support preparing for potential combat operations, while the last contributes to 
competition below the threshold of conflict.
Special reconnaissance activities enabling a greater and deeper understand-
ing of the contiguous bodies of water and their littorals along Russia’s mari-
time periphery are a first step in developing “strategic opportunities for the 
U.S. and its partners.”42 The mission of special reconnaissance—defined as “re-
connaissance and surveillance activities conducted as a special operation in, 
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but not limited to, hostile, denied, or diplomatically and politically sensitive 
environments to collect or verify information of strategic or operational sig-
nificance”—is a core special-operations task, and naval special-warfare assets 
are trained and equipped to perform it in and from maritime environments.43 
Maritime special reconnaissance generally requires capabilities not found in 
the conventional force.44 A thorough “mapping” of the Jominian maritime 
corridors would create greater situational awareness, with details on adver-
sary human activities and greater data on the meteorological, hydrographic, 
and geographic characteristics of the respective littoral regions.45 Extensive 
and comprehensive special reconnaissance of the waters along the pertinent 
Jominian rectangle faces—to include surface, subsurface, and coastal investiga-
tion—would lay a foundation for better knowledge of the adversary and enable 
a wider-ranging preparation of the environment for potential future opera-
tions, including combat if required.
For special operations forces, preparation of the environment is “an umbrella 
term for operations and activities conducted by selectively trained special opera-
tions forces to develop an environment for potential future special and conven-
tional operations.”46 In the European theater, naval special operations forces would 
prepare the environment to create conditions conducive for successful competi-
tion and other military operations on the spectrum of conflict, to include prepa-
rations to allow the U.S. military to embark quickly and successfully on combat 
operations if that becomes necessary.47 Subcombat competition could focus on 
exposing, illuminating, and addressing Russian commercial gray-zone activities 
in the maritime environment. As illustration, in September 2018, Finnish police 
and military raided the Finnish Baltic island of Säkkiluoto. A Russian business-
man from Saint Petersburg had purchased the island legally, then developed it to 
include nine piers, a helipad, and military-grade communications equipment.48 
While the Russian government denied ulterior motives, this type of activity easily 
could be highlighted within a maritime special-operations campaign for an al-
lied national government to conduct additional action. Such activities would nest 
within conventional USN objectives in the European theater and enable further 
military and interagency actions.
This maritime preparation of the environment, led by U.S. naval special-
warfare units in partnership with allies, would aim at identifying, understand-
ing, and framing sensitive Russian maritime decisive strategic points as tar-
gets for potential follow-on actions, deterrent or otherwise. Examples of these 
sensitive points include Russian pipelines, undersea cables, commercial ships, 
fishing vessels, navigational beacons, and other objects. Preparation activities 
are not exclusively covert, which by their nature have minimal, if any, deterrent 
effect. They also encompass military-engagement and security-cooperation 
10
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activities to build relationships with critical allies and their capability and capac-
ity to contribute to operations on the Jominian maritime template. Important 
partners include Finland, Sweden, the Baltic States, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, 
Greece, Georgia, and Ukraine. These partners can themselves support special 
reconnaissance of the maritime environment around Russia to refine the loca-
tion of specific targets and further develop them for additional activities. These 
activities align with established special-operations missions that include the 
reconnaissance of significant objects of interest; the tagging and tracking of 
significant maritime objects; and the logistics preparation for both special and 
conventional force arrival in a particular maritime region, to include the build-
ing of preconflict infrastructure.49
Finally, U.S. naval special-operations activities along the northern and south-
ern faces of the Jominian theater rectangle would enable refined and nuanced 
NATO information operations as part of active naval-diplomacy measures for 
both deterrent and coercive effect against adversarial Russian activities. If the 
aim of competition is to remain below the level of armed conflict, naval forces 
are particularly well positioned to support partners and allies, coerce adver-
saries, and advertise national sea power with the aim of influencing foreign 
leaders.50 Special operations forces, as opposed to conventional forces, have the 
most important role in the spectrum of conflict short of war, at a level where 
the military can support and integrate with other elements of national power, 
especially diplomatic and information components.51
Taken together, this idea suggests that linking naval special operations forces 
with overt naval diplomacy in the European theater is an effective and endur-
ing deterrence approach against a great power. This method aligns well with 
the concept of naval diplomacy as a “political instrument short of war” that 
aims to influence the “perceptions of policy-makers in hostile and friendly 
Powers.”52 As Geoffrey Till notes, naval diplomacy—what he terms presence—
enables both coercion and coalition building.53 Hence, naval special-operations 
activities and the presence of naval special-warfare detachments in these Eu-
ropean littoral and riparian regions would provide opportunities for selective 
deterrence or compellence messages aimed at creating anxiety or uncertainty 
in the minds of Russian national-security decision makers and developing 
narratives to counter and supplant Russian propaganda and disinformation 
campaigns. These information operations range from publicized maritime special- 
operations exercises with partner nations to signal allied solidarity and interoper-
ability, to visible maritime special operations forces boarding commercial ships 
with partner-nation law enforcement to demonstrate ship-interdiction capa-
bilities. These maritime special-operations activities, often military-to-military, 
can be amplified by ambassadorial-level diplomatic public affairs and media 
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engagement to message U.S. presence and commitment to allies and partners. 
These actions aim to offset contrary Russian media and commercial efforts.
Overt naval special-warfare activities that are visible but have a small footprint 
also could reinforce some generic U.S. European Command themes, such as the 
benefits of NATO and European Union membership for security and economic 
progress, the promotion of a common Black Sea allied naval presence, freedom-
of-navigation operations in support of international maritime law, and a reduc-
tion of overall Russian and allied military presence in the Arctic to prevent con-
flict and preserve the polar environment.54 These overt activities, amplified by 
appropriate and supporting information operations, have a twofold psychological 
effect. One aspect strengthens allied resolve through presence, placement, and 
the reinforcement of regional relationships. The other side is to create uncer-
tainty in the minds of adversary leadership, leading them to question what mari-
time special operations forces actually are doing in these sensitive littoral regions. 
For example, naval special-warfare patrol craft conducting visible and publicized 
operations with NATO-ally naval special operations forces in the littoral waters 
of the Barents and White Seas and the Baltic, Black, and Caspian Seas gener-
ates questions for Russia’s decision makers about the capabilities that the United 
States and partners could bring to bear against it, and concern about other ac-
tivities they may be performing clandestinely. Special-operations-forces activity 
often connotes or implies clandestine action, which, when coupled with the overt 
presence of naval special-warfare units and craft in a sensitive area, creates im-
pressions that can affect Russian leaders’ decision-making calculus and steer their 
reactions in the maritime space. The visibility of special-operations units alone 
may be more significant than the particular tasks they conduct.55
Naval special-warfare forces employing a Jominian operational approach, in 
combination with cyber and ISR operations, offer the United States and its allies 
a framework for sustained contest against Russian operations and activities in 
Europe as part of a wider, integrated deterrence effort while preparing the theater 
for potential conflict scenarios. In conjunction with conventional military capa-
bilities and coupled with U.S. efforts, naval special-warfare capabilities provide a 
maritime instrument for countering Russian competition and suggest a guide for 
action below the threshold of conflict in the European theater, particularly in an 
overt naval-diplomacy role. While balancing risks and escalation is essential to 
ensuring this approach keeps competition below the threshold of conflict, the na-
ture of gray-zone competition suggests that deliberate, methodical, and measured 
efforts to move the United States from a reactive to a proactive position in Europe’s 
competitive space can produce salutary strategic effects. It is ironic that Baron 
Jomini, who was concerned mostly with land-warfare theory and who served for 
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